



# Computer Forensics, Digital Evidence and the Corporate Security Agenda

**Peter Sommer**

London School of Economics, Open University

[peter@pmsommer.com](mailto:peter@pmsommer.com)

[p.m.sommer@lse.ac.uk](mailto:p.m.sommer@lse.ac.uk)



# ICT Trends


**Since 1995:**

- **Corporate computing has become more complex and embedded into organisations:**
  - Provides more information about the business, customers, etc
  - Uses Web and Internet for a very wide variety of customer/client interactions – many of these are heavily automated
  - Makes much greater use of Just-In-Time operations
  - Gives staff much more computing power on the desk and while mobile
- **Range of informal digital records as opposed to formal records has multiplied**


# ICT Trends


- 70% of UK homes have at least one PC; many have several, including older PCs; 93% are connected via broadband
- 38.8 m people (May 2010)
- 97% of all businesses have broadband Internet connections; 70% have a website
- *Cost of data media halves every 18 months*
- 120 cellphones per 100 of population
- Digital evidence is now normal and ubiquitous, not confined to a “hi-tech” ghetto
  - May be supportive, corroborative, indicative rather than central

Chart 1: How UK Internet Audience is composed – May 2010



Source: UKOM/Nielsen





# Digital Evidence

- Almost all organisations are heavily dependent on computers and ICT
- Many activities within and around an organisation will create *formal* records in digital form
- Nearly all activities within and around an organisation will create *informal* records in digital form

# Computer Forensics

- Finding unintended evidence from digital records

*as opposed to*

- Intended formal records:
  - Transaction logs
  - Audit tails



# Computer Forensics

*based on Forensic Science:*

- **Every contact leaves a trace**
- **Scientific methodology to “prove” reliability of procedure / artefact**
- **Relies heavily on reverse engineering**

# Digital Forensics Methodology

- Create “clean” or “virgin” test environment
- Make forensic disk image
- Introduce changes to be observed
- Make further forensic disk image
- Look for all the changes
- Repeat until you can formulate a rule to describe what is happening
- Test rule
- Publish
- Develop tool
- Test tool

# Incidents

- **Data Loss / DataTheft**
- **Frauds by employees and 3<sup>rd</sup> parties**
- **Contractual disputes**
- **Allegations of failure of duty of care**
- **E-mail and Internet abuse**
- **Breach of confidentiality**
- **Online defamation**
- **Employee / HR disputes**
- **Sexual harassment**
- **Acquisition and storage of child abuse images**
- **Datatheft / Industrial Espionage**
- **Software piracy**
- **Theft of source code**

# Incidents

- **Unauthorised access by employees**
- **Unauthorised access by 3<sup>rd</sup> parties – “hacking”**
- **Unauthorised data modification – incl viruses and trojans**
- **Abuse of corporate IT resources for private gain**
- **Use of corporate IT resources as one stage in a complex criminal act and where a 3<sup>rd</sup> party is victimised**
- **Use of corporate IT resources for illegal file-sharing**
- **DoS and DDoS attacks**
- **“Phishing” and “Pharming” attempts**
- **etc etc**

# Incidents

- **Rare, Spectacular Events**
- **Events that occur everywhere to everyone... but still cause panic, distress, loss**
- **High Impact / Low Frequency**
- **High Frequency / Individually, Medium-to-Low Impact**


# Requirements for Evidence

- **Employment Issues**
- **Insurance Claims**
- **Regulatory Issues / Proof of Compliance**
- **Civil Litigation**
  - You want to sue some-one
  - Some-one wants to sue you – and you must defend and disclose
- **Criminal Litigation**
  - You are the scene of crime
  - You may have to defend yourself / your employees
- **Freedom of Information Act Requirements**

# Life-cycle of incidents



Computer Incident Management  
Life Cycle





# The Investigator's Perspective

- What are the suspicions?
- How likely is it that the client has mis-interpreted the situation?
- What powers do I have?
  - I start out with no powers, I need to acquire them from the client
- Now to try and locate evidence ...

# The Investigator's Perspective

- Now to try and locate evidence ...
- How does the client's organisation work?
  - What functions does it perform?
  - How do I relate business functions to bits of hardware, software, computer records?
- Given the suspicions, what should I go for?
  - Transaction records
  - Emails
  - Web usage
  - Contents of PC, laptop, mobile phone, PDA, memory sticks, etc

# The Investigator's Perspective

- **Are there any restrictions on my access?**
  - Client authorisation as employer
  - Limits on employer's powers
    - Human Rights Act 1998
    - Data Protection Act,
    - Protection from Harassment Act, 1997
    - Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
      - Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice)  
(Interception of Communications) Regulations 2000
  - Computer Misuse Act 1990
    - as amended

# The Investigator's Perspective

- Are there any restrictions on my access?
- Penalties for breach of powers:
  - Criminal
  - Abuse of Process
  - Admissibility
  - Harassment
  - Etc etc

# The Investigator's Perspective: Technologies

- **PCs**

- Make reliable complete copy (“forensic image”) and analyse
  - Obvious, visible records, emails, Internet activity
  - Recovery of deleted data
  - Chronologies of activities
- Now standard procedures, products, training
- Imaging can be done covertly over night

File Edit View Tools Help

New Open Save Print Add Device Search Refresh Show Excluded Show Deleted Delete View Email Email/Internet Search To Filter Display

Cases Table Report Gallery Timeline Disk Code

Home Bookmarks Search Hits

Email History WebCache

Secure Storage Keywords

Home Attachments

Email

- Parker's HDD
  - Hotmail
  - Outlook Express
- Clyde's HDD
  - Hotmail
  - Outlook Express
- Fiske
  - Yahoo!
  - Outlook
- Hunter XP
  - Hotmail
  - Outlook Express
  - AOL
    - chaser 1191
      - Incoming/Saved Mail
      - Mail Waiting To Be Sent
      - Mail You've Sent
      - Mail
    - Girls

	Name	From	To	Subject	Created	Sent
<input type="checkbox"/> 1	Re: If you love your daughter	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: If you love your daughter		06/03/02 11:47:39AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 2	Re: Your Daughters Safety Depends on This!!!	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: Your Daughters Safety Depends on This!!!		06/03/02 10:33:32AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 3	Delivery Status Notification (Failure)	postmaster@guidancesoftware.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Delivery Status Notification (Failure)		06/03/02 09:17:30AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 4	Delivery Status Notification (Failure)	postmaster@guidancesoftware.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Delivery Status Notification (Failure)		06/03/02 09:17:30AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 5	Returned mail: User unknown	MAILER-DAEMON@aol.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Returned mail: User unknown		05/14/02 10:09:32AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 6	Criminal Defense Lawyers - California Criminal Justice Institute	billyray150b@netscape.net	chaser1191@aol.com	Criminal Defense Lawyers - California Criminal Justice Institute		05/23/02 07:09:31AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Welcome to My Calendar	AOLMyCalendar@aol.com	chaser1191@aol.com	Welcome to My Calendar		04/18/02 01:11:51PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 8	Re: Next few days	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: Next few days		04/03/02 08:35:03AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 9	Re: you gotta see this one	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: you gotta see this one		04/03/02 08:29:34AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 10	Re: Time Test	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: Time Test		04/03/02 08:28:39AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 11	Re: (no subject)	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: (no subject)		04/03/02 08:27:47AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 12	Re: xdrive	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: xdrive		04/03/02 08:26:55AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 13	Re: Instant Messaging	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: Instant Messaging		04/03/02 08:25:59AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 14	Re: http://www.xdrive.com/page.cfm?name=...	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: http://www.xdrive.com/page.cfm?name=...		04/03/02 08:25:10AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 15	Re: (no subject)	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: (no subject)		04/03/02 08:23:52AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 16	Delivery Status Notification (Failure)	postmaster@guidancesoftware.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Delivery Status Notification (Failure)		06/03/02 09:17:30AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 17	Re: Instant Messaging	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: Instant Messaging		04/03/02 08:25:59AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 18	Re: xdrive	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: xdrive		04/03/02 08:26:55AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 19	Delivery Status Notification (Failure)	postmaster@guidancesoftware.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Delivery Status Notification (Failure)		06/03/02 09:17:30AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 20	Re: Your Daughters Safety Depends on This!!!	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: Your Daughters Safety Depends on This!!!		06/03/02 10:33:32AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 21	Welcome to My Calendar	AOLMyCalendar@aol.com	chaser1191@aol.com	Welcome to My Calendar		04/18/02 01:11:51PM
<input type="checkbox"/> 22	Re: Next few days	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: Next few days		04/03/02 08:35:03AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 23	Re: you gotta see this one	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: you gotta see this one		04/03/02 08:29:34AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 24	Re: Time Test	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: Time Test		04/03/02 08:28:39AM
<input type="checkbox"/> 25	Re: (no subject)	billyray150@hotmail.com	Chaser1191@aol.com	Re: (no subject)		04/03/02 08:27:47AM

Text Hex Picture Report Console Details Lock 12932/62665

Attachments: NO  
From: billyray150@hotmail.com  
To: Chaser1191@aol.com  
Subject: Re: xdrive


EnScripts Filters Conditions Queries

- Conditions
  - Email Filter Condition
  - To Filter

Case 1\Hunter XP\C\Program Files\America Online 7.0\organize\chaser1191\AOL Personal Filing Cabinet\Chaser1191\Mail\Incoming\Saved Mail\Re: xdrive (chaser1191: PS 29323 LS 29323 CL 29323 SO 000 FO 0 LE 0)














EnCase Version 3 - [Case1.cas]

File Edit View Tools Window Help

New Open Save Add Preview Acquire Back Forward Prev Next Search EScript

Case Bookmarks Keywords 1


Table Gallery Timeline Report

	File Name	Is Bookmarked	Last Accessed	Last Written	File Created	Entry Modified
20	Computer Evid...		05/06/02	05/07/97 12:33:10PM	10/16/01 05:35:32PM	
21	CrimLR01.doc		10/16/01	03/29/00 10:52:58AM	10/16/01 05:35:44PM	
22	CrimLR01.exe		02/15/02	11/06/98 05:22:56PM	10/16/01 05:35:38PM	
23	CrimLR01.PDF		10/16/01	10/07/98 11:12:50AM	10/16/01 05:35:44PM	
24	crimlrinv01.doc		10/16/01	01/18/99 11:02:42AM	10/16/01 05:35:44PM	
25	Delhi01.doc		10/16/01	07/28/97 10:03:26AM	10/16/01 05:35:32PM	
26	Delhi02.doc		10/16/01	10/06/99 11:08:44AM	10/16/01 05:35:34PM	
27	Demise_s69.txt		10/16/01	04/03/00 08:15:50PM	10/16/01 05:35:46PM	
28	DIVA.txt		10/16/01	04/03/00 08:17:24PM	10/16/01 05:35:46PM	
29	dload.zip		10/16/01	05/01/98 08:06:48AM	10/16/01 05:35:36PM	

Text Hex Report Picture Disk Evidence Lock PS 2521926 LS 2521926 CL 311739 SO 0 FO 0 LE 1

000000 01133 00266 00399 00532 00665 00798 00931 01064 01197 01330 01463 01596 01729 01862 01995 02128 02261 02394 02527 02660 02793 02926

Volume D:\FORENS\ARTICLES\CrimLR01.doc



NetAnalysis - Forensic Internet History Analysis - [Massive.net]				
File Filter Exclude Investigate Search Tools Reports View Column Help				
Record URN: 10739				
Type	Last Visited [GMT]	Secondary Date	User	Internet History
FTP	02/16/2002 09:17:14 Sat		Administrator	ftp://dmares.com/pub/nt_32/compare.exe
FTP	02/16/2002 09:17:58 Sat		Administrator	ftp://dmares.com/pub/help_s/compare.hlp
News	05/26/2002 14:07:07 Sun	05/27/2002 06:58:18 Mon	Administrator	news://news.irsoftware.org/irsoftware.innosetup
URL	06/01/2002 20:53:55 Sat	06/01/2002 21:53:55 Sat	Administrator	http://www.guidancesoftware.com/cgi/ultimatebb.cgi
File	09/19/2002 19:16:09 Thu		Administrator	file:///D:/NetAnalysis1.14.3/NetAnalysis.vbp
Host	06/01/2002 08:00:43 Sat	06/01/2002 09:00:43 Sat	Administrator	Host: www.guidancesoftware.com
URL	06/01/2002 20:50:12 Sat	06/01/2002 21:50:12 Sat	Administrator	http://www.digital-detective.co.uk
URL	06/01/2002 20:54:16 Sat	06/01/2002 21:54:16 Sat	Administrator	http://www.guidancesoftware.com/cgi/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_profile;u=000000
Host	06/01/2002 08:02:29 Sat	06/01/2002 09:02:29 Sat	Administrator	Host: www.digital-detective.co.uk
URL	06/01/2002 20:48:04 Sat	06/01/2002 21:48:04 Sat	Administrator	http://www.digital-detective.co.uk/cgi-bin/digitalboard/YaBB.pl
Host	06/01/2002 12:53:24 Sat	06/01/2002 13:53:24 Sat	Administrator	Host: www.google.com
News	06/01/2002 13:34:07 Sat	06/01/2002 14:34:07 Sat	Administrator	news://news.mvps.org/ccrp.binaries.examples
Host	06/01/2002 13:34:07 Sat	06/01/2002 14:34:07 Sat	Administrator	Host: news.mvps.org
Host	06/01/2002 13:43:58 Sat	06/01/2002 14:43:58 Sat	Administrator	Host: www2.verisign-direct.com
URL	06/01/2002 20:53:47 Sat	06/01/2002 21:53:47 Sat	Administrator	http://www.guidancesoftware.com/cgi/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=forum&f=1
Mail	05/21/2002 07:47:22 Tue		Administrator	mailto:craig.wilson@digital-detective.co.uk
Java	05/28/2002 16:50:48 Tue		Administrator	javascript:DoConfirm('Are you sure you want to delete this
Java	05/28/2002 20:44:26 Tue		Administrator	javascript:void(0)
Res	06/01/2002 14:44:08 Sat		Administrator	res://C:\WINNT\System32\shdoclc.dll/dnserror.htm
Help	06/01/2002 18:36:49 Sat		Administrator	mk:@MSITStore:C:\Program%20Files\Microsoft%20Visual%20Stu
Cookie	06/01/2002 20:47:41 Sat		administrator	Cookie: administrator@www.guidancesoftware.com/
Res	06/01/2002 16:49:59 Sat		Administrator	res://C:\WINNT\System32\shdoclc.dll/navcancl.htm
Cookie	06/01/2002 16:52:14 Sat		administrator	Cookie: administrator@webcrawler.com/
URL	06/01/2002 18:42:05 Sat	11/22/2001 02:35:45 Thu	administrator	http://www.google.com/images/res0.gif
URL	06/01/2002 18:42:05 Sat	11/22/2001 02:35:45 Thu	administrator	http://www.google.com/images/res3.gif
URL	06/01/2002 18:42:05 Sat	11/22/2001 02:36:09 Thu	administrator	http://www.google.com/nav_first.gif
URL	06/01/2002 18:42:05 Sat	11/22/2001 02:36:09 Thu	administrator	http://www.google.com/nav_current.gif
URL	06/01/2002 18:42:05 Sat	11/22/2001 02:36:09 Thu	administrator	http://www.google.com/nav_next.gif
Secure	06/01/2002 09:43:23 Sat	05/10/2001 16:07:08 Thu	administrator	https://www.infragistics.com/images/menus/search_off.gif
Secure	06/01/2002 09:43:23 Sat	05/10/2001 16:12:48 Thu	administrator	https://www.infragistics.com/images/menus/cart_off.gif
www.digital-detective.co.uk TAG Type: History Source: Unallocated... Offset: 13969966 URL Records: 103284				

# The Investigator's Perspective

- **Main systems**
  - Full imaging likely to be technically difficult
  - Imaging is easier on a system taken off-line
    - But then the business is no longer functioning
  - Partial copying runs risk that it shows an incomplete picture of events
  - How far do existing back-up/archiving systems assist?
  - How do I limit my examination so as not compromise the rights of third parties?
    - Employees, customers, clients

# The Investigator's Perspective

- **Subsidiary systems**
  - Eg small specialist sub-systems
  - PDAs, laptops, cellphones, memory sticks, media players etc
  - Can we identify?
  - May be disputes over ownership, expectations of privacy
  - Some devices may be technically difficult to examine



# The Investigator's Perspective

- **On-going suspicions: “live” investigations:**
  - Keyloggers
  - Servlets
  - Network monitoring
  - CCTV
  - Human surveillance
  - Background investigations
  - Physical searches



# Technical Support

- **Keyloggers**  
→ hardware



completely invisible for computer operation (pure electronic device)  
No software or drivers required  
Huge 2MB flash memory disk, organized as a FAT file system  
Installs as a flash drive for data retrieve (visible to system as additional disk)  
Super fast data download (up to 100kB/s)  
Quick and easy national layout support  
Compatible with all Low-Speed USB keyboards (including Linux & Mac)

© Peter Sommer, 2010

With the Spector Pro Keylogger, you will be able to:



Capture ev  
(including us



Get the ex:



Capture &



Read ever,



Review ev



See everyt



See every



See every



Quickly fin

## Completely Invisible Stealth Technology



> //ACCESS GRANTED  
PASSWORDS  
ACCOUNTS  
USER NAMES  
EVERYTHING TYPED  
EVERYTHING THEY DO



The most advanced stealth technology available ensures that the Spector Pro keylogger is completely protected from everyone except those with authorized access.

Spector Pro does not appear in the Start Menu, Add/Remove Programs, Task Manager, Running Processes, System Tray, Registry, or on the Desktop – there aren't even any visible files.

"Spector Pro does the BEST  
job of hiding"  
– PC Magazine

"EVERY word they type, EVERY link  
they click, SpectorSoft will be  
watching"  
– InfoWorld Magazine

## Instant Alerts

See What They Type and  
What They View



The Spector Pro keylogger will instantly inform you whenever they type – or even simply VIEW – any "alert words" or phrases that you specify.

Spector Pro continuously looks for alert words in EVERYTHING they type, EVERY web site they visit, ALL chats/Instant Messages and in EACH email sent or received.

EVERY time a keyword is detected, Spector Pro will immediately email you a detailed report of WHEN, WHERE and HOW the keyword was used.

**Alerts are sent to your office,  
home, cell phone or wherever you  
want!**

"This is one slick piece of technology"  
– US News & World Report


LSE

# Tech

- **Servlets**

→ Eg EnCase Enterprise

→ Applied on a forensic exam



- 1 Examiner logs into safe for authentication and authorization
- 2 Examiner sends request to target node to snapshot volatile data or to preview drive
- 3 Examiner analyzes/reviews forensic or volatile data from target node
- 4 Analyze further or acquire image
- 5 Generate reports

# Network Surveillance

Wireshark (Untitled) - Wireshark

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Help

Filter: Expression... Clear Apply

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.0.24	Broadcast	ARP	who has 192.168.0.13? Tell 192.168.0.24
2	2.811077	192.168.0.28	192.168.0.1	DNS	standard query A news.bbc.co.uk
3	2.830511	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.28	DNS	standard query response CNAME newswwww.bbc.net.uk A 212.58.22
4	2.831483	192.168.0.28	212.58.226.20	TCP	2147 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0 win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460
5	2.851870	212.58.226.20	192.168.0.28	TCP	http > 2147 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1412
6	2.851957	192.168.0.28	212.58.226.20	TCP	2147 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=65535 Len=0
7	2.852877	192.168.0.28	212.58.226.20	HTTP	GET / HTTP/1.1
8	2.887300	212.58.226.20	192.168.0.28	TCP	http > 2147 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=641 win=7040 Len=0
9	2.894571	212.58.226.20	192.168.0.28	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
10	2.894610	212.58.226.20	192.168.0.28	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
11	2.894638	192.168.0.28	212.58.226.20	TCP	2147 > http [ACK] Seq=641 Ack=1449 win=65535 Len=0
12	2.915530	212.58.226.20	192.168.0.28	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
13	2.917217	212.58.226.20	192.168.0.28	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
14	2.917283	192.168.0.28	212.58.226.20	TCP	2147 > http [ACK] Seq=641 Ack=4273 win=65535 Len=0
15	2.918863	212.58.226.20	192.168.0.28	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
16	2.938667	212.58.226.20	192.168.0.28	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
17	2.938718	192.168.0.28	212.58.226.20	TCP	2147 > http [ACK] Seq=641 Ack=7097 win=65535 Len=0
18	2.940375	212.58.226.20	192.168.0.28	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]

Frame 1 (60 bytes on wire, 60 bytes captured)

Ethernet II, Src: 192.168.0.24 (00:05:1b:00:4f:14), Dst: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)

Address Resolution Protocol (request)

```
0000  ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 05 1b 00 4f 14 08 06 00 01  .....O.....
0010  08 00 06 04 00 01 00 05 1b 00 4f 14 c0 a8 00 18  .....O.....
0020  00 00 00 00 00 00 c0 a8 00 0d 00 00 00 00 70 02  .....p.....
0030  40 00 c8 53 00 00 02 04 05 b4 00 00                @..S.....
```

# External Logs

- **System Logs**
- **Web Logs**
- **Intrusion Detection System Logs**
- **Anti-Virus Logs**
- **ISP Logs**
  - **RADIUS**
  - **Web-Logs**

**Subject to  
DPA/ RIPA  
authorisation  
and/or  
consent!**

# Squid Logs

```
1007949021.553      86 192.168.0.103 TCP_MEM_HIT/200 6947 GET http://us.a1.yimg.c
om/us.yimg.com/i/ww/m5v6.gif graeme NONE/- image/gif
1007949022.484     4374 192.168.0.103 TCP_MISS/200 22349 GET http://www.yahoo.com/
graeme DIRECT/64.58.76.223 text/html
1007949022.884       74 192.168.0.103 TCP_HIT/200 4043 GET http://us.a1.yimg.com/u
s.yimg.com/a/ya/yahoo_promotions/fp2.gif graeme NONE/- image/gif
1007949027.488     4418 192.168.0.103 TCP_MISS/000 0 GET http://us.a1.yimg.com/us.
yimg.com/i/us/auc/b/auc16_1.gif graeme NONE/- -
1007949028.056     4569 192.168.0.103 TCP_MISS/000 0 GET http://us.i1.yimg.com/us.
yimg.com/i/us/sh/pr/hol01/rib.gif graeme NONE/- -
1007949028.059     4604 192.168.0.103 TCP_MISS/000 0 GET http://us.i1.yimg.com/us.
yimg.com/i/us/sh/pr/hol01/bow.gif graeme NONE/- -
1007949028.061     4544 192.168.0.103 TCP_MISS/000 0 GET http://us.i1.yimg.com/us.
yimg.com/i/space.gif graeme NONE/- -
1007949028.063     4346 192.168.0.103 TCP_MISS/000 0 GET http://us.a1.yimg.com/us.
yimg.com/i/sh/h99/holly.gif graeme NONE/- -
1007949028.065     4258 192.168.0.103 TCP_MISS/000 0 GET http://us.a1.yimg.com/us.
yimg.com/a/an/anchor/shopping/ads/new37/dell.gif graeme NONE/- -
1007949029.233     1163 192.168.0.103 TCP_MISS/302 148 GET http://www.yahoo.com/r/
m1 graeme DIRECT/64.58.76.227 -
1007949032.096       73 192.168.0.103 TCP_HIT/200 1365 GET http://us.i1.yimg.com/u
s.yimg.com/i/us/pim/maillogin.gif graeme NONE/- image/gif
1007949032.324     3089 192.168.0.103 TCP_MISS/200 12044 GET http://mail.yahoo.com
:[]
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lwn.net/images/sp.gif
H lwn.net/images/linuxpower2.png
lwn.net/images/narrow.png
lwn.net/images/eklektixsm.png
stats.lwn.net/1pixtrans.gif
lwn.net/2002/0214/security.php3
lwn.net/images/security.png
```

(96.03% to 100.00%) 60.00% Fri Feb 15 08:48 2002

| h = help

LSE

# Forensic Readiness Plan

## Why have plan?

- To reduce costs and panic
- External consultants will have to “learn” the business
- Lawyers will have to identify admissibility and privilege issues on the spot
- Can also be used for other legal situations, eg internal disciplinary disputes, routine transaction disputes, to aid law enforcement

# Pro-active strategies

## Two apparent alternative routes:

- Certification of compliance with appropriate standards
- Forensic Readiness Program

*(in fact they can complement each other)*



# Standards Compliance

 **CabinetOffice**

## HMG Security Policy Framework

V 1.0 December 2008

Making  
government  
work better

### MANDATORY REQUIREMENT 37

Departments and Agencies must have the ability to regularly audit information assets and ICT systems. This must include:

- a) Regular compliance checks carried out by the Accreditor, ITSO etc. (documented in the RMADS audit of the ICT system against configuration records).
- b) A forensic readiness policy that will maximise the ability to preserve and analyse data generated by an ICT system, that may be required for legal and management purposes.

b) A forensic readiness policy

# Standards Compliance

## Standards Compliance

- **IS027001:**
  - Ch 4: processing information & documents (retention)
  - Ch 7: Combatting Cyber Crime (evidence)
  - Ch 13: Compliance – legal and policy
  - Ch 14: Detecting and Responding to Incidents
- **IS027037: Guidelines for identification, collection and/or acquisition and preservation of digital evidence (DRAFT)**

# Standards Compliance

- BIP 0008-1: **Code of practice for legal admissibility and evidential weight of information stored electronically**
- BIP 0008-2: **Code of Practice for Legal Admissibility and Evidential Weight of Information Communicated Electronically**
  - Emails, SMS, IMs, web-services, EDI
- BIP 0008-3: **Code of Practice for Legal Admissibility and Evidential Weight of Linking Electronic Identity to Documents**
- BIP 0067:2006: **A guide to developing a retention and disposal schedule for business information**
- *and associated work-books*
- ISO 15489: **Records Management**

# Reliable record keeping regulatory compliance

- **Sarbanes-Oxley**
- **Basel II**
- **UK Combined Code of Corporate Governance**
- **Freedom of Information legislation**
  - Particularly important for the public sector!

# Standards Compliance

## Reasons for aiming for Standards Compliance:

- Process is likely to identify a wide range of deficiencies which can then be corrected
- May be useful (or essential) contractually as defining expected service standards

# Standards Compliance

## Typical discovered deficiencies:

- No information policy document
- No retention schedule
- Inappropriate / inadequate security controls
- Lack of procedural documentation
- Insufficient control of document input procedures
- Insufficient information about the technology from the system supplier

# Standards Compliance

## Typical discovered deficiencies:

- lack of documentation on audit trail content and access procedures
- use of inappropriate facilities, such as image clean-up or “deletion” facilities
- no thought of future migration requirements

# Standards Compliance

## Limitations of Standards Compliance

- Standards do not absolutely guarantee admissibility or acceptability for weight
- Standards are inevitably generic – may not cover everything you really need and may also ask you to spend much time explaining and justifying why some aspects are irrelevant
- Can be disproportionately costly and disruptive
- Introduces a box-ticking approach over more fundamental analysis (if done badly)



# Standards Compliance

## Limitations of Standards Compliance

- Rather useless if nearly all detailed activity is left to outside consultants
- Can produce a false sense of security
- May omit important informal records
  - PCs, laptops, cellphones, PDA etc
- May not be especially persuasive in certain overseas jurisdictions
- May not deal effectively with the practical mechanics of disclosure, explanations to court, issues of inextricably linked material

# Forensic Readiness Programs

## Essentially:

- Based on threat analysis / scenario development
- Requires identification of potential evidence / disclosure requirements – and plan for their formal production
- Results in a proper Contingency Plan – which is tested and kept up-to-date

# 7-step Forensic Readiness Plan

## Identify:

- **the main likely threats/ legal challenges faced by your organisation**
- **what sorts of evidence / disclosure you are likely to need if you have to proceed to civil or criminal litigation**
- **what you will need to do to meet various regulatory and compliance requirements (incl FoIA)**
- **how far you may have that material already**
- **what you will need to do to secure additional essential material**

# 7-step Forensic Readiness Plan

- the management, skills and resources implications for your organisation
- turn the results into an action plan – which will need regular revision as the organisation and its ICT infrastructure develops.

# **7-step Forensic Readiness Plan**

**The Good News:**

**quite a bit of the work may already have been  
carried out elsewhere in the organisation....**

**.....Disaster Recovery / Business  
Contingency Plans**

# Business Contingency Plans

- **Preparation against disaster:**
  - Fire
  - Flood
  - Terrorism
  - Denial of access
  - Computer failure
  - Etc etc

# Business Contingency Plans

- **Tells organisation what to do:**
  - Emergency Priorities
  - Team that will act / Reporting Responsibilities
  - Migrated offices, locations
  - Migrated people
  - Migrated ICT
  - PR for customers, clients, investors, bankers, public-at-large etc

# Business Contingency Plans

## Research, Design

- Business Analysis
  - to determine priorities (it's too expensive to restore everything instantly)
- Relation of business processes to specific ICT resources, hardware, software, communications links; availability of back-up
- Detailed plan for who does what when
- Emergency Response Team
- Internally published Plan
- Frequent Testing and Revision




# Forensic Readiness Plan: Additional Requirements

- Legal / Regulatory requirements
- Analysis of back-up plans
  - Incremental / complete
- Specific Data Retention / Destruction requirements
- Decisions about mode of disclosure
  - Electronic, print-out, extents, etc
- Witness to explain systems, material produced, testify to reliability and completeness

# In-House Capabilities?

- **How far should you try to do some of this internally?**
- **The First Aid analogy:**
  - Everyone has a first aid box, most have a trained first-aider, some have in-house nurses, a few have in-house doctors, no-one has a full complement of specialised surgeons
- **Forensic Computing**
  - First Responder
  - Incident Analyst
  - Evidence Preservation skills
  - Management Advisor

# Guide to Digital Investigations and Evidence



**First published  
2005; now  
updated  
[www.iaac.org](http://www.iaac.org)**

# CPNI Guidance



NISCC Technical Note 01/2005

Issued 27 May 2005

An Introduction to Forensic Readiness Planning

**QinetiQ**

Robert Rowlingson Ph.D  
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National Infrastructure  
Security Co-ordination Centre  
PO Box 832  
London, SW1P 1BG

Tel: 0870 487 0748  
Fax: 0870 487 0749  
Email: [enquiries@nisco.gov.uk](mailto:enquiries@nisco.gov.uk)  
Web: [www.niscc.gov.uk](http://www.niscc.gov.uk)

## 10-step Guidance

# OU M889

- **Open University Module in Digital Investigations**
- **Distance-Learning – 26 week course**
- **Designed to bring “computer security” people and others up to speed with forensic readiness**
- **Within an academic framework**

# Remedial Activity

- The final “prize” from having a FRP:
- Closing the Loop / Learning the Lessons
- *Although the FRP is aimed at legal outcomes, after any event you will have a detailed explanation of what went wrong*
- *Should lead to precise remedial actions*



# Computer Forensics, Digital Evidence and the Corporate Security Agenda

**Peter Sommer**

London School of Economics, Open University

[peter@pmsommer.com](mailto:peter@pmsommer.com)

[p.m.sommer@lse.ac.uk](mailto:p.m.sommer@lse.ac.uk)

